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No Shortage of Tanks!
The Canadian Army’s System for the Recovery, 
Repair and Replacement of A and B Vehicles 
and Major Weapons Systems 
A R T H U R  G U L L A C H S E N
Abstract : This article is an overview of the First Canadian Army in 
North West Europe’s ability to recover, repair and damaged, destroyed 
and broken down vehicles and weapons systems. This capability was a 
crucial factor in maintaining the overall combat power of the Canadian 
Army Overseas during operations in the last year of war. To support this 
argument the author examines Canadian wartime primary documents as 
well as multiple secondary sources.
Given the hiGh intensity of combat operations during the Canadian Army’s period of service in North West Europe 
(nwe) during the last eleven months of the war in 1944-1945, an 
effective system of equipment recovery, repair and replacement was 
essential. While what has been written on wartime equipment and 
vehicle repair, recovery and replacement has mainly focussed on 
German armoured forces 1939-1945, little focus has been devoted 
to researching these capabilities within Allied units. Whether or 
not a Canadian unit’s offensive and defensive capabilities were at a 
high level during this time period was dependent on the number of 
© Canadian Military History 2018
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operational vehicles and major weapons systems that were available.1 
The “A” and “B” categories of vehicle classification, taken from the 
British Army system, encompassed nearly all vehicles within the 
Canadian Army in the late war period. The “A” vehicle category 
included nearly all heavy and light armoured combat types and the 
“B” classification encompassed all lighter, soft-skinned, wheeled 
supply and general service types. If a unit’s equipment inventories 
were significantly below their war establishment levels, its level of 
military effectiveness would be impaired. These establishment levels 
were the organizational guides that determined how each combat 
arms unit was equipped in the way of personnel, vehicles, equipment 
and weapons in order to conduct its mission. Canadian units suffered 
equipment losses due to all causes, and often at a rapid rate within 
infantry, armoured and anti-tank regiments, often making their real 
strength below war establishment levels. Unit activity and exposure 
to enemy action determined how rapidly losses such as this occurred. 
Accidents and normal wear and tear were also unrelenting, taking 
vehicles and weapons systems out of action just as effectively as 
enemy action. 
The operational record, systems and structure of First Canadian 
Army’s repair and replacement services for “A” and “B” vehicles and 
major weapons systems in nwe will be examined within this article. 
That these organizations were remarkably successful at achieving their 
main goal of maintaining the combat strength of the Canadian Army 
Overseas (cao) is the conclusion presented. The historical significance 
of these processes lies in their level of effectiveness.  Nearly always 
fully functional, these processes allowed Canadian combat formations 
to maintain their strength in the face of a sustained level of high losses 
over an extended period. By addressing the question of how Canadian 
combat arms units maintained their equipment strength, this article 
contributes to the wider debate on Allied military effectiveness, the 
value of the size of the Allied support units compared to combat units, 
and aids the goal of a larger understanding of the unique methods 
used by the Western Allies to pursue their war aims.
1  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553. 21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report, 
File 215A21.085 (D1). Monthly returns from May 1944 to May 1945 detail exactly 
what was considered an “A” or “B” vehicle, and how many were held at the divisional, 
corps and army level.  Within the British Army, all combat vehicles were classified as 
“A” vehicles, while non-combat soft-skinned vehicles were classified as “B” vehicles.
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Never wanting for an acceptable level of vehicles and heavy 
weapons systems allowed Canadian units to remain combat effective 
for the vast majority of the time during 1944-1945. In contrast to 
German forces, new and repaired vehicles and weapons systems 
reached front-line artillery, armoured and infantry units at a much 
faster rate and in larger quantities. The Corps of Royal Canadian 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (rceme) epitomized this 
contrast in organizational structure and performance as they were 
largely separated from the combat arms units they serviced past 
the second line of maintenance, making them much more effective. 
This article will discuss the process of delivering new and repaired 
vehicles and weaponry first, including a description of the specialist 
organizations involved. This will be followed by an outline of the 
rceme recovery and repair system, its evolution as an organization 
and its performance in the field.
Critical secondary sources analyzing the process of repairing and 
replacing vehicles and major weapons systems within the late war 
Canadian Army are virtually non-existent.  The author has tried 
to partly fill this gap with a previous article entitled “Destroying 
the Panthers: The Effect of Allied Combat Action on I./ss Panzer 
Regiment 12 in Normandy, 1944”, which in part compares Canadian 
replacement and recovery techniques with those of the German 
Panzerwaffe, or tank arm.2 In this article the significance of efficient 
recovery and replacement techniques within Canadian armoured 
formations was highlighted as vital to those unit’s operation and 
combat capability. While other works exist on the repair and 
maintenance of German armoured vehicles, writing on maintaining 
and replacing Allied vehicles or major weapons systems mainly 
consists of official histories and small details within larger areas of 
operational research. There are two exceptions, focused on American 
and Soviet forces. The first is Belton Y. Cooper’s Death Traps: The 
Survival of an American Armoured Division in wwii.3 Written by 
a Combat Command Ordnance Officer and published in 1998, this is 
a first-hand account of the staggering tank losses encountered by the 
2  Arthur Gullachsen, “Destroying the Panthers: The Effect of Allied Combat Action 
on I./SS Panzer Regiment 12 in Normandy, 1944,” Canadian Military History, 25, 
2, Article 13 (2016): 1-29, http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol25/iss2/13  (accessed 10 
May 2017). 
3  Belton Y. Cooper, Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armoured Division 
in WWII (New York: Presidio Press, 1998).
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u.s. Army at the hands of German weapons systems and the effort 
needed to maintain the strength of u.s. armoured formations. The 
second is “Tank Repair and the Red Army in wwii” by Gary wwii. 
Dickson.  Using Russian archival and secondary sources, this article 
illustrates the importance tank maintenance played in allowing Red 
Army Tank Corps to maintain their strength in a series of never-
ending armoured offensives from 1941-19454
As the larger twin to the personnel replacement organization, the 
1st Canadian Echelon within 21st Army Group headquarters dealt 
with the equipment and weaponry concerns of the First Canadian 
Army. It must be noted however that Canadian command, control and 
administration had its limitations. Like all wartime Commonwealth 
armies, the cao was dependent on the will and ability of the British 
government to supply it with large amounts war material.5 By late 
1943, a majority of Canadian units designated for the 1944 invasion of 
the continent were properly equipped and training intensively.6 As the 
campaign in Normandy raged in the summer of 1944, the continued 
stockpiling of large amounts of war material on the continent was 
not a great challenge. This was due to the Battle of the Atlantic 
being largely won by late 1943, Allied economies reaching their full 
production capacities by mid-1944, and the Normandy beachhead 
being securely established in June of that year.7 British political 
will and ample cooperation with the Canadian government was also 
present, and this allowed the Canadian military to be equipped and 
4  Gary A. Dickson, “Tank Repair and the Red Army in World War II”, The
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25, 3 (2012):  381-92, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351
8046.2012.705650  (accessed 10 May 2017).
5  Canadiansoliders.com, “4th Canadian (Armoured) Division”, http://www.
canadiansoldiers.com/organization/fieldforces/casf/4thdivision.htm (accessed 14 
January, 2016); Charles Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the 
Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North 
West Europe 1944-45 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 
1960), 247-52.   As of October 1942, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division only had 
255 Universal Bren Gun Carriers with which to train with. It did not receive tanks 
until later.
6  John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign: A Study in the 
Failure of High Command (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Works, 2009), 104. 
7  Richard Holmes, ed., The Oxford Companion to Military History (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 105, 655. The decisive convoy battles that broke 
the back of German submarine arm occurred in mid-1943. The Allies in Normandy 
were superbly supplied despite storms which damaged their artificial harbours in 
June 1944. John Ellis, Brute Force (London: Andre Deutsch, 1990), 526, Statistical 
Appendix: Tables 26-63. Allied war production peaked during 1944.
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re-supplied as needed. As a result, the cao enjoyed full access to 
a well-stocked common pool of largely American Lend-Lease and 
British produced equipment.8
The total amount of equipment removed from the strength of 
combat arms units on the front line because of mechanical failure 
or enemy action usually amounted to 100 per cent of the unit 
establishment within several months. The total number of vehicles 
within a battalion-sized regiment in the Canadian Army was spread 
between its administrative echelons. These three echelons consisted 
of the A1 (Fighting) echelon, with everything needed to carry out 
the combat mission, the A2 Echelon, which had everything needed 
8  G.W.L Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment 
of Canadian Artillery Volume II: 1919-1945 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 
1972.), 55-58.  As an example, on arrival in England all Royal Canadian Artillery 
(RCA) regiments were completely equipped with British produced equipment in the 
years 1939-1942.
The remains of Sherman tanks and carriers waiting to be broken up at a British vehicle dump 
in Normandy, 1 August 1944. [© IWM (B 8394)]
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to immediately resupply the A1 Echelon, and the small B Echelon, 
which consisted of all supply and stores items not immediately 
needed and the administrative support elements required to keep a 
battalion-sized combat grouping functioning. Vehicle attrition in the 
three echelons within combat arms units was due to excessive use, 
enemy action and travel over harsh terrain. The highest equipment 
losses for the Canadian Army in nwe occurred during the three 
months of the Normandy Campaign. Combat in Normandy was 
more intense and affected a greater number of combat arms units 
than subsequent infantry-oriented battles during late 1944 and early 
1945 in the Netherlands and the Rhineland. During this time, a 
greater amount of German heavy weapons and armoured vehicles 
were present within multiple German panzer divisions, the Canadian 
Army’s primary opponent in the months of June–August 1944. The 
fighting power of these German formations made a sizeable impact on 
the monthly totals of Canadian equipment losses. These totals drop 
off markedly once the campaign in Normandy came to a halt in late 
August, and are relatively low on average for the reminder of the war, 
as remaining German armoured forces were mainly engaged to the 
south against British and u.s. armies.
As an example, of the sixty-one Sherman tanks the 6th Canadian 
Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) fielded on D-Day, nearly all were 
lost to enemy action or mechanical failure by the end of August 
1944. The Hussar Sherman tank “Holy Roller”, now a monument 
in London, Ontario, was the only one to survive in the regiment’s 
possession from D-Day until the end of hostilities.9 Enemy action was 
not often the real threat.  Tanks sent away for heavy maintenance 
would often return with another unit, or not at all, being replaced 
by a newer variant that was more technologically advanced. The fate 
of “Holy Roller” was very much the exception rather than the rule.
The administrative system designed to replace all Canadian 
equipment losses was sophisticated. As illustrated in Chart 1, there 
were a total of five administrative areas within the First Canadian 
Army’s area of operations. From the front lines to the rear areas, 
these zones consisted of the divisional administrative area, the corps 
9  The Family of Captain Proctor Clifford Neil, “Captain Neil’s Story ~ Bio & 
Military Cross Award,” In Captain Proctor Clifford Neil:  Honouring the life and 
accomplishments of a WWII Hero, http://www.captainpcneil.com/holy-roller.html 
(accessed  5 July 2016). 
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troops area, the corps administrative area, the forward maintenance 
area and the line of communications area.10 Canadian 1st Echelon 
control of major weapons systems and vehicle logistics began with 
the Canadian Army Ordnance Maintenance Company (omc), which 
was actually much larger strength than a company.  It consisted of 
a headquarters, a regulating station section, a stores section, an 
ammunition section and a tank section. It received all manner of 
supplies, vehicles and equipment from British-controlled vehicle and 
ordnance depots located within close transportation distance to the 
First Canadian Army rail or road head.
10  John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook for the First Canadian Army, 1944-45: 
Formation Organization, Staff Technique and Administration (Lower Sackville: The 
Regimental Historian, 1996), 91.
11  Ibid, 92-93.
Chart 1: Path of new major weapons systems and “A” & “B” vehicles (excluding heavy 
armoured fighting vehicles).11
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Rail and road heads were located in the Line of Communications 
Area and were the logistical start points for the Canadian Army in 
nwe. There were often multiple First Canadian Army rail and road 
heads in existence during 1944-1945 as the front moved forward. At 
these rail and road heads various Royal Canadian Army Service 
Corps (rcasc) units and numbered supply depots were present. The 
Canadian Army omc then distributed what it received from the 
British Army to Canadian army-level equipment storage locations, 
fuel and ammunition dumps and vehicle parks. Before anything 
moved or entered storage, the omc and road and rail head personnel 
worked to prepare all war material for these possibilities as required. 
In a reverse flow, these road and rail heads also received damaged or 
obsolete equipment that had been removed from the front.12  
If railroad transport was not available, new vehicles and 
ordnance was driven forward by second-line transport from the 
line of communication area depots to the corps-level ordnance field 
park.13  Second-line transport consisted of trucks and other assets 
operated at the corps and army level; first line being those in the 
fighting divisions and their formations. There was eventually a total 
of two ordnance field parks within the First Canadian Army in April 
1945.14 The corps-level ordnance field park would contain everything 
in order to support a complete army corps, with the exception of 
rations, water and petroleum products.  All forms of heavy and light 
weapons and quantities of all types of ammunition and spares for all 
weapon assemblies were present. Smaller stores such as small arms, 
optics, engineer, signals and workshop equipment were also held. 
Large parking areas contained row upon row of new and repaired 
“A” and “B” type vehicles. Only light “A” vehicles were present, the 
heavier armoured fighting vehicles (afvs) having their own separate 
transport and replacement system. On top of all this, quantities of 
specialist “A” and “B” vehicles (command vehicles, wireless trucks, 
recovery vehicles and specialist light tracked carriers) were present.15 
This park then fed the forward division-level ordnance field parks 
and respective armoured or infantry Sub Field Parks. From these 
12  Ibid, 92-93.
13  Ibid, 92.   Second-line transport was corps and army-level transport, and first-line 
transport was attached to divisional units.
14  Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661, Appendix F: Order of battle for all 
Canadian Army units in NWE. 
15  John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 92-93.
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parks, deliveries were made to further supply points or the items 
were signed for on a need basis as regimental units required them. 
For smaller deliverable items that could be pushed forward, these 
parks supplied divisional Delivery Points (dps). At these dps, unit 
B Echelon (supply and administrative) troops of the combat arms 
regiments showed up to sign for authorized equipment, vehicles, 
weapons and supplies on a need basis.
The weapons systems delivered to the Canadian Army omc 
that required the largest logistical resources to transport them 
to the front were heavy armoured fighting vehicles (afvs).  As 
depicted in Chart 2, these were cut away from the remainder of the 
logistical process at the omc and began their own transport path. 
These vehicles were the major weapons systems of the armoured, 
armoured reconnaissance, self-propelled field artillery and anti-tank 
units. Prior to large scale operations, Canadian armoured regiments 
saw it as imperative to have the number of operational tanks be 
close as possible to the war establishment tables. The 2nd Canadian 
Armoured Brigade’s strength as of 31 January 1945, immediately 
prior to February’s Operation Veritable, was 214 tanks against a war 
establishment figure of 226.16 Units containing armour would report 
their replacement needs through an afv or tank state that would be 
reported on a daily or weekly basis. These daily and weekly returns 
from the regimental headquarters (rhq) of each unit were forwarded 
up the chain of command. For example, an armoured regiment’s 
afv state would indicate a daily summary of “fitness” for 75mm 
cruiser tanks (Sherman), 17-pounder (Pr) Fireflies (Sherman Ic or 
Vc with the longer gun) and 37mm reconnaissance (M3 Stuart) light 
tanks. “Fit” would refer to an afv being fully combat operational. 
As of 1 November 1944, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division fielded 
247 “fit” tanks of all makes and seventy-nine “fit” scout cars.17 For 
rca field artillery and anti-tank units, self-propelled (sp) M-10 tank 
destroyers and sp Sexton howitzers would be reported as part of their 
16  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553. 21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report. 
File 215A21.085 (D1). 31 January 1945 return.  
17  LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,793. 4th Canadian Armoured Division A & Q War Diary 
November, 1944. T-10550. Return on AFVs within the division, 1 November, 1944.
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gun state.18 At the armoured brigade level the combined states of all 
armoured regiments would be forwarded to higher command from 
the brigade headquarters. If an armoured unit was short tanks in any 
of its troops or squadrons, it would be tasked to receive new afvs at 
a certain date. These repaired or new replacement tanks would be 
driven to the front, transported by low-bed trailer or loaded onto rail 
cars and then received at the B Echelon of the receiving regiment. 
The key component of the replacement process for armour was 
the 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery Regiment (25th cadr). This 
regiment was divided into a total of eight functioning squadrons, 
titled A through H.19 The 25th cadr squadrons in nwe operated a 
sophisticated and efficient system for supplying new and repaired afvs 
to all Canadian Army units that operated them. They also supplied 
British, Polish and Czech units operating within the Second British 
Army and First Canadian Army. The first 25th cadr squadrons 
to land in France during June-July 1944 were initially under the 
command of the 1st British Corps. These were then incorporated 
into the 2nd Canadian Corps and the First Canadian Army after 
both became operational in mid-July and early August 1944. “C” 
Squadron landed in Normandy on 7 June 1944 and immediately 
began transferring tanks to the three armoured regiments of the 
2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade.21 On 10 July 1944, “E” Squadron 
18  LAC, RG24 Volume 10,670. Equipment State Canadian Army Monthly Report. 
File 215C1.083 (D6). The final report at the Army level was the above monthly 
returns of all controlled stores, such as 25-pounder Howitzers and 17-pound anti-
tank guns on a divisional basis.
19  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,276. C Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery 
Regiment War Diary June 1944. T-12748. The 25th CADR squadron war diaries 
are very detailed regarding actual deliveries of tanks to the units. The only caveat 
is that often there are discrepancies between the numbers reported being delivered 
to a regiment and the receiving regiment’s strength increase. This was largely due 
to breakdowns in transit, delays in reporting and tanks being sent back to delivery 
squadron to correct kit deficiencies. It was also noted in the course of this research 
that early in the campaign due to a shortage of AFVs there was some “borrowing” 
between armoured regiments. Also, when a regiment was in action they often did not 
have time to report their strengths and losses. It would take a day or two afterwards 
for all tanks and crews to be accounted for.
20  LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663. Chart 2: First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of 
AFV “A” vehicle Recovery, Repair and Replacement. File 215C1.045 (D12). John 
Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 93.
21  Leonard Curchin, The Elgins: A Regimental History (St. Thomas: The Sutherland 
Press, 1977), 78.  These regiments had suffered large losses in the period of fighting 
6-7 June 1944.
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arrived within the beachhead. This squadron was responsible for tank 
deliveries at the 2nd Canadian Corps level. These two squadrons were 
followed by “F” Squadron landing on 23 July 1944. This squadron 
was to aid in railhead acceptance of afvs and be responsible for 
delivery of vehicles at the First Canadian Army level once the army 
became operational. In this role, it was also the squadron responsible 
for sending tanks to British, Czech and Polish armoured units under 
First Canadian Army command. “D” Squadron of the 25th cadr 
Chart 2: First Canadian Army system of armoured fighting vehicle (afv) replacement: Paths 
of new/repaired afvs to combat arms regiments.20
11
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landed on 26 July 1944, and was responsible for all units within the 
4th Canadian Armoured Brigade.22
British stocks of replacement afvs were delivered to large vehicle 
depots on the continent near road heads and rail heads by transport 
units of the British Army. The Canadian Army receiving procedure 
to accept these vehicles into service was quite comprehensive. 
Working together in tandem during this process from August 1944 
onward was the omc’s Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps (rcoc) 
Tank Railhead Section and the 25th cadr’s “F” squadron. These 
two groups would receive a shipment of afvs from the British Army’s 
Vehicle Company, Army Ordnance Delivery organization. Once they 
22  Ibid, 78. Once D Squadron disembarked it immediately turned over twenty-two 
tanks with full crews to 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade to cover losses suffered 
9-10 August 1944.
Sherman tanks and other vehicles under repair at a REME depot, 3 July 1944. [© IWM (B 
6328)]
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had arrived, the new afvs would have their documents examined 
and kit removed and re-checked at the “F” Squadron tank park. 
Next, the armament would be degreased and a general cleaning of 
the fighting compartment would take place. After this, the sprockets, 
road wheels and tracks would be adjusted and repaired as required. 
Following this, a general servicing of weapons, radios, and the power 
traverse would occur. Any modifications needed would be completed 
by the Canadian Army’s 3rd Canadian afv Support Unit and the 
4th Canadian Armoured Troops (third-line Maintenance) Workshop, 
working alongside “F” Squadron. Once this was concluded, optics, 
radios and fragile equipment would be installed or boxed for transport. 
Next, all onboard stowage of ammunition would be completed in 
accordance with authorized tables. Finally, the Light Aid Detachment 
(lad) attached to “F” Squadron would then re-certify all the afvs to 
make sure they were mechanically fit. Once this was completed, the 
tanks were ready to be sent out.23 If “fit” tanks were not issued right 
away, they would be maintained by 25th cadr personnel in the “F” 
Squadron tank park.
Once an order was received for tanks to be sent forward, the 
appropriate number would then be driven, transported by rail or 
loaded onto tank transporters for the trip from “F” Squadron to the 
25th cadr corps delivery squadron.24 This squadron would then feed 
the two forward delivery squadrons of the 25th cadr present in nwe 
in August 1944. Within their operating bases, 25th cadr squadrons 
operated “tank circuits”, with each stop in the circuit checking over 
an area of the tank. This repetitive inspection and receiving process 
at each squadron could take time. While of questionable efficiency, 
it was effective at resolving issues vehicles had arrived with and 
prevented these problems from reaching armoured regiments in the 
field. At any point repaired vehicles which had come from rceme 
facilities could join a 25th cadr squadron.
23  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,279. F Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery 
Squadron War Diary, October 1944. On 2 October 1944, several Kangaroo armoured 
personnel carriers slated for delivery to the 1st Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier 
Regiment by “F” Squadron, 25th CADR, were instead re-routed back to Royal 
Canadian Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME) maintenance 
units due to mechanical issues. 
24  LAC, RG24 Volume 10,457. Tank Replaces and Releases. File 212C1.1009 
(D28). Chart detailing the actions of a rear delivery squadron of the 25th Canadian 
Armoured Delivery Regiment.
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In order to meet demands for new afvs quickly, 25th cadr 
squadrons usually had an afv “float” or balance that they could 
draw from, similar to the Canadian Army personnel reinforcement 
Canadian Base Reinforcement Group (cbrG) units. This float was 
a percentage of the total afvs in service with the front-line units 
that a 25th cadr squadron was designated to support. Though this 
percentage went up and down with supply and demand, there was 
always an effort made to maintain the desired inventory level to deal 
with emergencies. This allowed the 25th cadr to be able to respond 
very quickly to a recipient unit’s requests for large reinforcements. 
The best example of this rapid response capability is the 10 August 
1944 delivery by “D” Squadron, 25th cadr of twenty-two fully-crewed 
Sherman tanks to the 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment.25 This 
regiment had lost forty-four Shermans, two Stuarts, one Crusader 
anti-aircraft tank and one scout car totally destroyed in battle 
on 9 August 1944.26 This immediate resupply, plus four tanks the 
regiment had as a reserve Left Out of Battle (lob) contingent, gave 
it a total reinforcement of twenty-six new tanks. This number would 
theoretically make it capable of immediate combat operations. On 
12 August 1944, a further sixteen tanks were delivered, bringing up 
the regiment’s new tank deliveries to thirty-eight for the period 10-12 
August 1944.27 The number of tanks delivered in this example and 
the speed in which they arrived is very impressive.
The process of afv replacement and repair within an average 
Canadian armoured regiment over an eighteen-day period during 
August 1944 is depicted in Chart 3. In these two and half weeks, 
the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment lost a significant number 
of vehicles due to enemy action and mechanical failure. It had 
participated in Operations Totalize, Tractable and the initial battles 
of the Falaise Pocket. Though significantly weakened, after the 
delivery of new and repaired vehicles, the regiment fielded thirty-
eight “fit” tanks on 18 August. With an additional two tanks in 
25  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277. D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery 
Regiment War Diary August 1944. T-12748. 9 August 1944 entry.
26  LAC, RG24 Volume 14,292. 28th Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary 
August 1944. T-12764. War Diary entry for 9 August 1944 notes the one-day loss 
on Hill 140 of forty-four Shermans, two Stuarts, one Crusader anti-aircraft tank and 
one scout car.
27  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,277. D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery 
Regiment War Diary August 1944. T-12748. 12 August 1944 entry.
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the regimental lad repairable within two days, forty would be “fit” 
by 20 August. Though not perfect, this was enough to theoretically 
field three squadrons of four troops. Each troop could field three 
tanks each, plus four for the headquarters squadron. Other regiments 
involved in heavy combat also received large numbers of replacement 
tanks in short order. The 25th cadr took an incredibly short time 
to become operational on the continent in the wake of D-Day. For 
example, to replace the D-Day amphibious assault losses inflicted on 
the 1st Hussars (6th Canadian Armoured Regiment), twenty new or 
repaired tanks were delivered on 10 June 1944.28
Within the German Army, tank losses due to combat and 
mechanical failure were not replaced as efficiently as within the 
Canadian Army. As an example, the second battalion of the German 
Panzer Lehr Regiment 130 in Normandy was sent only eleven 
replacement Panzer IV tanks on 8 July 1944, having received none in 
June.29 As illustrated in Chart 4, the effects of combat, mechanical 
failure and battle damage on the battalion’s strength in the period 
1-26  June 1944 were severe. Repairs were also slow, as they occurred 
within the panzer units rather than in specialized separate repair 
units. As of 26 June, there were forty-seven Panzer IVs in short and 
long-term repair near the chaos of the front lines. Over the course of 
the campaign in nwe, the 25th cadr was successful at re-supplying 
all Canadian units operating heavy afvs.30 This was due to large levels 
of production from repair workshops and 25th cadr forward delivery 
squadrons being able to maintain large “floats”.31 As an example, “D” 
Squadron, 25th cadr delivered a total of 295 new and repaired afvs 
to the 4th Canadian Armoured Division during the month of October 
1944.32 This was enough to nearly re-equip the entire division. 
As illustrated in Charts 5 and 6, Canadian armoured regiments 
maintained their strength while opposing German units withered. 
It also certainly helped that Allied forces in nwe during 1944-1945 
28  Michael McNorgan, The Gallant Hussars: A History of the 1st Hussars Regiment 
1856-2004 (Alymer, ON: The Alymer Express, 2004), 132.
29  Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power 
and Organizational Effectiveness (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 2000), 386.
30  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,287. 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment tank state 
report. File 1044.
31  Niklas Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 390.
32  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,278. D Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery 
Regiment War Diary October 1944. T-12748.
15
Gullachsen: No Shortage of Tanks!
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,
16 No Shortage of Tanks!
possessed total air superiority, had large amounts of replacement 
equipment and vehicle movement, and recovery was unimpeded.
The delivery of non-afv major weapons systems and other 
equipment did not utilize any special delivery squadrons to transport 
Chart 3: 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment Sherman 75 mm and Firefly 17-pounder (Pr) 
losses, replacements and “fit” status 1-18 August 1944.30
Chart 4: German II./Panzer Lehr Regiment 130’s Panzer IV tank strength returns and losses 
due enemy action and mechanical failure 1-26 June 1944.31
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it to a fighting unit. Once past army-level ordnance parks, it was 
deposited or driven to corps-level ordnance field parks by second-line 
transport. From these locations, it was then moved to the divisional-
level field parks. At the division level, there was a divisional ordnance 
field park and a corresponding armoured or infantry ordnance sub-
park. One of each was allocated to each Canadian armoured or 
infantry division.33 The field parks were numbered by the division 
number, and the sub-parks were numbered 201-205. For example, 
the 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s ordnance depots consisted 
of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division Ordnance Field Park and 
the 205th Canadian Armoured Ordnance Sub-Park.34 In these large 
parks, all manner of equipment, vehicles and stores were located in a 
manner similar to the corps level parks. From these points, divisional 
units would be authorized on a need basis to help themselves in order 
to retain their wartime establishments.
rca field artillery, anti-tank and light anti-aircraft regiments 
reported their status in a very similar manner as the armoured 
units. For artillery regiments, the guns were their primary piece 
of equipment and the number of operational guns and those under 
repair was constantly monitored. A gun state of ordnance holdings 
accompanied by an ammunition usage report was forwarded each 
day by an artillery regiment’s rhq to higher rca command. These 
returns were very important, as their data was used to calculate 
supply requirements and to gauge ammunition usage.35 The returns 
would make their way up the chain of command, and army-level  field 
ordnance parks would then authorize the release of new equipment to 
make up for combat and mechanical losses. New replacement artillery 
equipment was held by army group-level British Army ordnance field 
parks. The Canadian army-level ordnance park would then receive 
new equipment from the omc and move it to the corps-level ordnance 
33  Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661, Appendix F: Order of Battle for 
Canadian Units in NWE. 
34  Charles Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 661, Appendix F: Order of Battle for 
Canadian Units in NWE.
35  LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,661. First Canadian Army A & Q War Diary December 
1944. T-7093. Ammunition usage and receipts return. 1st British Corps and 2nd 
Canadian Corps, 16 December 1944. The guns state was also needed in order to 
arrange for the supply of the required amount of ammunition that was needed to 
keep it combat capable. Continuous delivery was needed for regular operations and 
extra on an irregular basis for larger operations.
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field36 parks.37 Repaired and reconditioned equipment would also be 
36  Roman J. Jarymowycz, “The Quest for Operational Maneuver in the Normandy 
Campaign: Simonds and Montgomery Attempt the Armoured Breakout”   (PhD 
diss., McGill University, 1997), 336, Appendix E:  Strength returns for the 2nd 
Canadian Armoured Brigade in June 1944. Because of the quick practice of back-
loading tanks with any problems past the abilities of the light aid detachment, all 
these Shermans must be considered operational. 
37  Norbert Szamverber, Waffen SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of 
SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-Panzerjager Abteilung 12 Normandy 1944 based 
on their original war diaries (Solihull, England: Helion and Company, 2012), 234, 
Appendix VII: Tank strength of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 1 June-11 August 1944. 
Chart 5: Operational tank strength of 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment’s Sherman tanks 
June 1944.  War establishment = 50 Shermans.36
Chart 6: Operational tank strength of the German II./ss Panzer Regiment 12’s Panzer IV 
tanks, June 1944.  War establishment = 101 Pz IVs.37
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transported by rceme personnel to the division field ordnance parks 
and sub-parks, where it would be taken on strength (tos).
The divisional ordnance parks would contain everything in the 
way of new and repaired towed artillery pieces, replacement artillery 
vehicles and radios. While all artillery equipment and weaponry was 
very sophisticated, maintaining and operating it was less complicated 
than an afv with its motor, running gear, transmission, power turret 
traverse, sights and radios. Compared to a 17-Pounder   anti-tank gun, 
a Firefly tank was much more challenging from a maintenance and 
delivery perspective, hence the lack of a 25th cadr-type organization 
exclusively for artillery regiments. The approach to maintaining 
sophisticated artillery systems in 1944-1945 was very similar to that 
for an “A” or “B” vehicle. The successive “lines” within the rceme 
repair system could handle increasingly difficult artillery repairs. 
1st Canadian Armoured Brigade Firefly and Sherman Ib 105mm Sherman in the Hague, 
Netherlands, May 1945. [© Ary Koppejan / Nederlands Fotomuseum]
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Guns constantly required maintenance, but this could largely be 
completed at the regimental level by the lad. If a gun was worn out 
or damaged, it could be easily replaced. A new one would be picked 
up at the field ordnance or sub-parks by a gun crew with an artillery 
tractor or tower. New or repaired guns were drawn as needed to 
replace weapons under repair or that were lost in battle. An example 
of a mass draw of new equipment occurred in early August 1944. All 
three rca field regiments within the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 
drew an entirely new complement of seventy-two towed 25-Pounder 
howitzers, turning it their old 105mm Priest self-propelled guns.38
In nwe during 1944-1945 there were many heavy afvs operated 
by non-Canadian Armoured Corps (cac) regiments within the 
Canadian Army. These were mainly artillery observation post (op) 
tanks, self-propelled artillery, tank destroyers and artillery towers 
operated by rca units. These vehicles were delivered by the 25th 
cadr in exactly the same manner as a Sherman Firefly tank was 
delivered to an armoured regiment. Universal Carriers, T-16 and 
M-14 gun tractors were also “A” vehicles, but the delivery of these 
smaller vehicles was accomplished via tank transporters due to their 
low weight and small size.
In contrast to the German Army during 1944-1945, the Canadian 
Army was totally mechanized in all areas that required soft-
skinned “B” vehicles. This very large motor pool was one of First 
Canadian Army’s greatest strengths. It allowed Canadian forces 
to be very mobile and carry out all logistic tasks, increasing their 
military effectiveness. As opposed to occasional A combat vehicle 
shortages, there was never a shortage of soft-skinned transport in 
Canadian units. The 31 August 1944 “B” vehicle return for the 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division shows 125 General Service 3-ton lorries 
on strength as opposed to its war establishment number of 104, 
making it significantly over-strength. 39 In comparison, the German 
12th ss Panzer Division as of 1 June 1944 had only 65 per cent of its 
38  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,472. 14th Field Regiment, RCA War Diary August 
1944. T-16371. 7 August 1944. The British field ordnance park in question for this 
exchange was designated a “Royal Artillery re-organization centre”.
39  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553. 21st AG. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report. 
File 215A21.085 (D1). 31 August 1944 return. “B” vehicle state for the 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Division as of 31 August 1944.  
20
Canadian Military History, Vol. 27 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol27/iss1/1
  21A RT H U R  G U L L A C H S E N 
authorized number of trucks operational, and only 33 per cent of its 
gun tractors.40
Unsophisticated general service (Gs) vehicles could be used in 
multiple roles by virtually any type of unit. Some examples of Gs 
“B” vehicles within the Canadian Army were 3-ton lorries and jeeps. 
Many were produced in the United Kingdom (u.k.) with a right-
hand drive, while others were of North American manufacture. Not 
being afvs, they could only sustain low amounts of damage and had 
a limited capability to mount weapons. More specialist Canadian 
Army “B” vehicles, such as petrol tankers and command caravans, 
came with assigned drivers to operate them. Documentation for 
these vehicles had to follow the vehicle from point to point, and their 
employment and status was monitored constantly.
As shown in Chart 7, the British 21st Army Group vehicle depots 
would release “B” vehicles as authorized by 2nd Canadian Corps 
and later First Canadian Army headquarters. Released “B” vehicles 
would travel directly to either to the Canadian corps-level ordnance 
40  Russell Hart, Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Reimer Publishing, 2001), 225. This state of affairs reduced the mobility of 
the division in Normandy drastically.
REME troops with their Diamond T 969A Wrecker working on a disabled Universal Carrier 
in the centre of Cahagnes, 2 August 1944. Canadian crews would have looked very much like 
these. [© IWM (B 8498)]
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field park or a delivery point near the division-level ordnance field 
park.41 Unit drivers would sign for the new vehicles on a need basis 
at the dp near the divisional ordnance field park. Gs category “B” 
vehicles that were repaired by rceme maintenance units would also 
go directly to the dps near the divisional ordnance field park, where 
they would also be picked up by unit drivers. New and repaired 
41  LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663. First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of “B” vehicle 
delivery/replacement. File 215C1.045 (D12); John Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 
93, Appendix D: Canadian Army System of Supply of Ordnance Stores in the Field 
Chart 1944.
Chart 7: First Canadian Army vehicle path chart for “B” vehicle replacement.41
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specialized vehicles such as wreckers, radio vehicles and ambulances 
would be assembled at the corps-level ordnance field park. From this 
point, these specialist vehicles could be dispersed to unit dps, but 
only with the proper documentation and the assigned driver. Only 
2.5 per cent of the respective corps total unit holdings of various 
technical vehicles would be held in divisional field ordnance parks 
and dps as replacements.
The Canadian Army’s recovery and repair system for maintaining 
its inventories of vehicles, weapons and equipment during the 
campaign in nwe was maintained by units of rceme. Its creation 
and the repair and recovery systems utilized by its units were directly 
influenced by the introduction of the British Army equivalent, The 
Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (reme), which 
officially came into being in October 1942. In October 1941, the 
British Beveridge Report had identified the need to properly employ 
large numbers of skilled tradesmen, engineers and technicians which 
had hurriedly been put into uniform in the mobilization of 1939.42 
This recruitment had stripped a section of British industry that 
desperately needed their skills. At the same time, these personnel 
were not being correctly employed within the military to utilize their 
capabilities. It was deemed necessary to release some of these some 
personnel for civilian wartime production and re-enroll those still 
needed within the British Army to utilise their technical expertise 
for maintenance duties.
The subsequent British Sinclair-Weeks-Dunkly Report of 
February 1942 went further to recommend the creation of a new 
corps of electrical and mechanical engineers. This corps would mainly 
affect British Royal Ordnance Corps (roc) engineering personnel 
then currently responsible for repair, recovery and replacement duties. 
After royal assent, this corps became reme and it was officially 
incorporated into the British Army in the fall of that year.43 New 
processes came into effect simultaneously to allow the recovery and 
repair of all British Army vehicles, weapons and equipment in the 
shortest amount of time.
42  Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50: the Story of Electrical and 
Mechanical Engineering in the Canadian Armed Forces, electronic edition (Borden, 
ON: The Guild of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Branch Charitable 
Trust, 2008), 267.
43  Ibid, 268.
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In May 1942, the commander of the cao, Lieutenant-General 
Andrew McNaughton, pointed out the importance of keeping cao 
systems for recovery, repair and maintenance as similar as possible 
to the British while minimizing organizational change. As a result, 
British reme processes were officially introduced into the Canadian 
Army as of January 1943, but personnel affected by these processes 
remained in the rcoc. Despite two-thirds of all rcoc personnel by 
1942 being involved in maintenance or other engineering roles (E 
Branch) rather than logistic stores roles, resistance to the creation of 
a new corps was prevalent within the upper levels of rcoc leadership, 
made up of senior (O Branch) stores officers. While still not having 
created a new corps, by the time Canadian forces participated in the 
Sicilian Campaign in the summer of 1943, British reme processes 
had been fully adopted. Overworked divisional workshops had been 
reorganized into multiple brigade workshops and regimental level 
LADs within participating Canadian formations.44
Due to pressure from on-loan reme British officers within cmhq 
and public debate within the parliament in Ottawa spurred on by the 
civilian Canadian Engineering Institute and its publications, discussion 
within the cao regarding the creation of a separate corps regained 
strength in the spring and summer of 1943.45 Further meetings within 
cmhq over operational planning details of Operation Overlord, the 
invasion of France, acknowledged the need for a separate mechanical 
engineering corps within the cao. Official organizational change that 
created the Canadian Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
(ceme) finally came into effect on 1 February 1944, one year and six 
months after the official incorporation of reme into the British Army. 
With royal assent, ceme became rceme on 2 April 1944, just in time 
for the Normandy invasion.46 With this act, virtually the entire “E” 
Branch of the rcoc were rebadged to become the first members of 
rceme. This final transformation put the final administrative and 
command touches on the maintenance process evolution within the 
fully mechanized cao. It was now more capable than ever of keeping 
44  Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen: The Story of the Corps of Royal Canadian 
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and of the Land Ordnance Engineering Branch 
(Ottawa: RCEME Corps History, 1983), 167.
45  R.H. Hodgson, Doug Knight (Editor), The RCEME History Series Volume 1: The 
Formation of the Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, 
electronic version (Ottawa, ON: The RCEME Corps Fund, 2016), 21.
46  Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 269.
24
Canadian Military History, Vol. 27 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol27/iss1/1
  25A RT H U R  G U L L A C H S E N 
a major percentage of cao vehicles and major weapons systems 
operational. The creation of an entirely new army corps and adoption 
of new repair and recovery processes were significant mileposts 
in the evolution of the Canadian Army during the Second World 
War. Overcoming extreme institutional resistance, former rcoc “E” 
Branch officers had finally prevailed to make the cao significantly 
more operationally effective.
When conducting operations, the cao’s recovery and repair system 
was divided into levels so that no one area was overstressed by its 
workload. If there was an over load at one level, or the task was too 
complicated, it would be passed to the next successive level, commonly 
designated as a “line”. As illustrated in Charts 8 and 9, rceme had 
a total of four “lines” of maintenance to repair mechanical faults or 
battle damage. First-line was the organic repair services attached 
to the combat arms regiments. Further lines (levels) after this took 
on successively more difficult and complicated repair and rebuilding 
assignments. The majority of the work in the rceme workshops and 
lads was done prior to or after combat operations. Enemy action was 
responsible for only a very small percentage of second-line workshop’s 
tasks. Their workload was divided as follows: over 95 per cent of jobs 
related to mechanical breakdowns, 2 per cent stemmed from battle 
damage and 3 per cent involved road accidents.47 Each successive 
line took on more difficult jobs that required more repair hours, 
more replacement parts, other specialized tools and more specialized 
tradesmen to accomplish. Items that were dealt with by the first 
or second lines of maintenance were the easier jobs that could be 
done quickly. This allowed maximum resources to be deployed into 
repairing and making operational the maximum number of vehicles 
in the shortest amount of time. For example, a vehicle or weapon 
repair job that would take more than four hours was immediately 
back-loaded out of a lad’s area of operations. Secondly, on occasions 
during a rapid advance, the main body of a brigade-level rceme 
workshop could be split into two sections if necessary, establishing 
rear or forward advanced workshop detachments (awd and rwd). 
These were non-standard special teams detached from the workshop 
to meet a particular temporary need. It could be made as large or 
small as the tactical situation demanded. These teams were tasked 
with providing advanced recovery and repair services in cooperation 
47  Ibid, 42.
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with rceme first-line maintenance lads at the regimental level or 
remaining behind a brigade workshop’s main body as it advanced.48 If 
needed, the awd could act as the link between the first and second 
lines of maintenance, these two lines taking the lion’s share of repair, 
recovery and maintenance duties.49
48  Ibid, 42-44. 
49  Ibid, 42.
Chart 8: First Canadian Army lines of maintenance for the recovery and repair of “A” and “B” 
vehicles and major weapons systems.48
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The first-line maintenance capability within the combat arms 
regiments consisted of the lad workshops. One was attached to each 
rca and cac regiment, the infantry lads held at the brigade level. 
For example, the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade’s three regiments 
had the following lads, each manned by rceme troops:50 the 6th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment contained the No. 54 lad, the 10th 
Canadian Armoured Regiment was assigned the No. 55 lad and the 
27th Canadian Armoured Regiment was issued the No. 85 lad.
These small light detachments were designed to be extremely 
mobile and had a minimum number of personnel, vehicles and 
equipment. They dealt with easily correctable problems that afv and 
gun crews could aid in resolving within a certain time limit. They 
put maximum effort into these easier problems and “back-loaded” 
(sent to the rear) what could not be handled quickly or was beyond 
their capabilities. The main duties of the lad were light welding, 
mechanical repairs and assisting in maintenance questions. They 
were spread evenly throughout the regimental administrative (A1, 
A2, B) echelons of the regiment they were assigned to. Though they 
contained limited capabilities, the lads could work very hard in 
cooperation with the crews to make a large number of small repairs 
in a very short period of time. As an example, No. 54 lad of the 1st 
Hussars (6th Canadian Armoured Regiment) made a titanic effort to 
repair tanks in the aftermath of the disastrous 11 June battle at Le 
Mesnil-Patry, where heavy losses were suffered.51
afvs, vehicles, and ordnance back-loaded by a regimental lad for 
second or third-line maintenance would be collected by its respective 
brigade workshops’ recovery platoon assets and back-loaded to the 
brigade collection point. This collection point was within the workshop’s 
base of operations or very near to it. It also worked closely with the 
three regiments of each brigade, but also with divisional troops, such 
as the field artillery, machine gun and anti-tank regiments. The lad’s 
from these divisional units would be designated to feed a certain 
brigade workshop in exactly the same manner as one of the armoured 
or infantry brigade’s regimental lads. There was no major difference 
between the duties of an armoured or infantry brigade workshop. 
50  Ibid, 327, Appendix 5.
51  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,213. 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment (1st Hussars) 
War Diary June 1944. Reference was made on this date to a large effort made by No. 
54 LAD to repair a significant number of damaged tanks.
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For an infantry brigade, its brigade workshop would collect, repair 
or back-load all infantry afvs, vehicles and ordnance in exactly the 
same manner as the armoured brigade workshop.
Canadian Army second-line rceme repair assets consisted of 
the main body of the brigade workshop. As an example, the 2nd 
Canadian Armoured Brigade had the 2nd Armoured Brigade 
Workshop assigned to it. Despite the misnomer, the brigade workshop 
operated in what was considered a divisional-level repair area if the 
workshop in question was part of an infantry or armoured division. 
The second-line brigade workshop’s main bodies in armoured or 
infantry divisions were to be located no more than two hours from 
the location of the lad. These main bodies were not very mobile, and 
The crew of a Sherman tank of the Westminster Dragoons (2nd County of London Yeomanry) 
repairing damage to one of its suspension units caused by an 88mm anti-tank shell, 7 June 
1944 caption. Canadian tank crews would have repaired mine damage in this manner. 
[© IWM (B 5423)]
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had trouble keeping up with the rapid advances of First Canadian 
Army in August and September 1944.
This was especially the case with workshops operating within the 
4th Canadian Armoured Division. In response, its brigade workshops 
from September 1944 onwards began to be sited very near the front. 
In this case, the need for an awd special team was removed and 
the main body of the brigade workshop took on its role. If needed 
a rwd would remain far to the rear with less mobile elements, 
totally reversing the standard procedure. The three infantry brigade 
workshops within the two Canadian infantry divisions in nwe after 
August 1944 also struggled to remain close to the moving front 
lines. To mitigate the distances one workshop’s entire main body was 
always located forward, the other two located further to the rear or 
REME troops work to repair the track on a Sherman tank in heavy rain, near Geilenkirchen, 
Germany, 25 November 1944. [© IWM (B 12087)]
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in transit.52 Also within the second-line maintenance structure was 
the 2nd Canadian Corps Troops Workshop. This facility provided 
repair services for corps-level units. The lads of corps-level combat 
units would feed the corps workshop in exactly the same process as 
the infantry and armoured lads fed their brigade workshop.
If an afv or other equipment was sent off strength (sos) as a 
repair casualty to a second-line maintenance unit, it was taken off 
the strength of its original regiment. It was now on the strength of the 
respective rceme unit, and all further repair work would be completed 
by rceme personnel.53 The repair process was quite flexible, and 
there was no rule that a certain squadron’s tank had to return to its 
respective squadron or regiment. As a new or repaired similar tank 
emerged from the repair and reinforcement pipeline, it would instead 
take its place and be delivered by the 25th cadr forward squadron.
Despite the infantry and armoured titles, the armoured and 
infantry brigade workshops also worked on afvs and other ordnance 
that was employed by the rca field artillery and anti-tank units. 
Artillery op tanks, self-propelled howitzers, self-propelled anti-tank 
guns and artillery towers all broke down and suffered battle damage 
at the same rate as infantry and armoured unit afvs. If a rca artillery 
afv was finished repairs, the designated 25th cadr squadron would 
deliver this vehicle to an rca unit in exactly the same manner as it 
would to an armoured unit. As part of its role, the corps-level “E” 
Squadron, 25th cadr was responsible for delivering tracked artillery 
“A” vehicles directly to the rca regiments. The “B”,”C”, “D” and “G” 
squadrons of the 25th cadr were responsible for the tank equipped 
Canadian armoured brigades.54
The third line of rceme maintenance was designated to complete 
the rebuilding and reconditioning of equipment. This was not a 
service available within the first and second lines as shown in Chart 
9. Rebuilding and reconditioning took a very long period of time and 
had to be completed in a static factory-like environment. In these 
52  Ibid, 65.
53  LAC, RG 24 Volume 10,553. A & B Canadian Vehicle Position Report. File 
215A21.085 (D1). 21st AG 30 November, 1944-31 January 1945 returns. Divisional 
vehicles strengths in this time period do often go down, but this is not to enemy 
action but due to mechanical repairs. 
54  LAC, RG 24 Volume 14,278. E Squadron, 25th Canadian Armoured Delivery 
Regiment War Diary December 1944. Multiple entries regarding the delivery of RCA 
self-propelled artillery pieces and Ram tracked gun tractors (towers) exist.
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locations detailed and complicated work could take place out of the 
way of the elements and enemy action. This was their designated 
role, but the majority of their work was overflow from second-line 
maintenance. The corps troops, armoured brigade and infantry brigade 
workshops could all feed overflow repair cases directly to third-line 
units. The No. 2 Tank Troops Workshop was an example of a third-
line rceme asset in the summer of 1944. This facility was used as an 
overflow catch point for overworked second-line brigade workshops.55 
The third-line maintenance units lacked integral transport, and faced 
extreme difficulties in remaining at a fixed distance from second-line 
workshop bases. If one was ordered to move forward, others stayed 
in place as long as they could to remain effective and take on the 
moving unit’s workload. All third-line maintenance facilities were 
under the command of the First Canadian Army Deputy Director of 
Mechanical Engineering (ddme) as of 1 September 1944.56
Canadian Army fourth-line maintenance was a capability that 
existed in the form of the No. 1 and No. 2 Advanced Base Workshops. 
The No. 1 Canadian Base Workshop, as the parent organization of 
these fourth-line facilities, remained in the u.k. These organizations 
were commanded by the Director of Mechanical Engineering (dme), 
21st Army Group. These fourth-line assets were designed to be 
available at the rate of one per Canadian corps. They provided 
factory-like rebuilding and reconditioning services for vehicles and 
other major pieces of equipment on a higher level than third line. 
These groups could also be utilized for special missions in addition to 
their designated roles. For example, No. 1 Advanced Base Workshop 
inspected and performed maintenance on over 400 guns prior to 
Operation Totalize in early August 1944. It also rebuilt and repaired 
large numbers of submerged vehicles that had been recovered from 
the Juno and Sword Beach landing areas in Normandy.57 If third-
line maintenance assets could not handle a job or were overloaded, 
these two facilities could assist in completing, rebuilding and 
reconditioning tasks.58 Specialized recovery assets in the army-level 
line of communications area also existed. The rceme Canadian Army 
No. 2 and later No. 1 and No. 3 Recovery Companies operated in 
55  Murray Johnston, Canada’s Craftsmen at 50, 70-71.
56  Ibid, 65.
57  Ibid, 74.
58  Ibid, 64.
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Chart 9: First Canadian Army process for “A” & “B” vehicle and major weapons system 
recovery and repair.(Armoured Division example).60
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the strategic route-clearing c and recovery role past the corps and 
divisional areas of responsibility. Prior to August 1944, there was 
little vehicle and equipment back-loading above the regimental and 
brigade level due to the small area within the Normandy beachhead. 
As the breakout from Normandy developed in August 1944, these 
activities increased as broken-down vehicles were littered across 
northern France.5960
Once repairs were completed, the vehicle or piece of ordnance 
would be sent on its way.  Using an afv as an example, once it was 
deemed “fit” by a repair line of maintenance, it was immediately 
shipped back to the relevant squadron of the 25th cadr. At that 
point, it would be sent off strength (sos) of the rceme unit that 
had worked on it and was now on the strength with the 25th cadr 
squadron. Once the 25th cadr squadron delivered it, the afv would 
join the strength the armoured or rca artillery unit, and the circle was 
complete. At its height in May 1945, the rceme repair organization 
was large and extremely capable. A total of 150 rceme units and sub-
units existed, from the lad detachments within combat arms units to 
fourth-line maintenance facilities located in static locations.
In conclusion, this article has presented a short overview of 
Canadian Army recovery, repair and replacement procedures and 
its performance record in maintaining the maximum number of 
operational “A” and “B” vehicles and major weapons systems during 
its campaign in nwe 1944-1945. Canadian Army personnel utilizing 
these procedures proved extremely effective at maintaining vehicle 
and weapon strength within the cao. The existence of effective rceme, 
rcoc and 25th cadr procedures and operations are historically 
significant due to their being largely responsible for maintaining the 
combat strength of the Canadian Army in the late war period. The 
cao in nwe was very lucky to employ what were largely British Army 
procedures which had evolved by trial and error during 1939-1943 
into a very sophisticated system in the late war period. During the 
Italian campaign in 1943-1944, the Canadian Army had opportunity 
to practice these methods in the field. On its arrival in nwe, familiar 
practices were put into action with excellent results. Canadian 
59  Ibid, 62.
60  LAC, RG24 Volume 10,663. First Canadian Army Plans Diagram of AFV “A” 
vehicle recovery, repair and replacement. File 215C1.045 (D12).
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combat arms regiments were never hindered in their operations due 
to any sort of shortage of “A” or “B” type vehicles or major weapons 
systems.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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